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One dimensional stylized model taking into account spatial activity of firms with
uniformly distributed customers is proposed. The spatial selling area of each firm is
defined by a short interval cut out from selling space (large interval). In this represen-
tation, the firm size is directly associated with the size of its selling interval.
The recursive synchronous dynamics of economic evolution is discussed where the
growth rate is proportional to the firm size incremented by the term including the
overlap of the selling area with areas of competing firms. Other words, the overlap
of selling areas inherently generate a negative feedback originated from the pattern of
demand. Numerical simulations focused on the obtaining of the firm size distributions
uncovered that the range of free parameters where the Pareto’s law holds corresponds
to the range for which the pair correlation between the nearest neighbor firms attains
its minimum.
1 Introduction
The study of elemental interactions in social and economical systems has a great
importance to understand the large-scale system properties. One of the universal
large-scale properties exhibited by social systems in a robust way is the Pareto’s
law of wealth distribution and firm size [3, 6, 10]. Pareto’s law is generally
associated to the observation, that personal income of individuals, the size of
companies are distributed by power-law.
The formation of power-laws has generally complex origin. Among other
approaches, highly sophisticated multi-agent models have been developed [2, 14,
15] to explain the power-laws observed in various social systems.
In this paper we propose agent-based model that emphasizes role of spatial
location of firm within the limited market area. The model approximates the
basic mechanisms of competency that simply follows from the spatial positions
and selling activities of firms.
An extensive economic literature exists that deals with the competitiveness as
consequence of location. One dimensional model of spatial duopoly introduced
by Hotelling [8] has assumed that consumers are continuously and uniformly
distributed along a line segment. The model of firm distribution in a non-uniform
environment has been developed by Lawrence [16]. It predicts firm density in an
urban setting in which the population density decreases exponentially with the
distance from the center. Erlenkotter [5] has considered uniformly distributed
demand over the infinite plane. He has discussed various regular two-dimensional
market shapes. An elegant and advanced multistore competitive model of two
firms in a finite business area has been introduced by Dasci and Laporte [4]. This
model has been investigated for one and two dimensional geographical markets.
It assumes the costumers are dispersed through space in only one direction along
some coordinate x ∈ (0, 1). In this regard it is useful to mention the functional
expression for total revenue per firm∫ 1
0
Q(x)f(x)dx , (1)
where f(x) is the probability density function of the customers multiplied by
the probability Q(x) that customer at x patronizes product of given firm.
As we have mentioned before, our present approach also pays attention to
spatial aspects. The approach comes from ecologic-economic feedback concept
of regulated factory emissions introduced by us recently [9]. The work points
out an emergence of critical properties in a two dimensional system with spa-
tially distributed agents balancing the conflicting objectives. The model assumes
that sources of diffusive emissions compete with the distributed sensorial agents.
The analysis of the complex numerical data yield us to reductionist and purely
geometric formulation that is related to coverage percolation problem. The
geometric idea has been applied here to study the spatial distribution of the
competitive firms reduced to basic geometric objects that cover market area.
Our stylized spatial model is defined as it follows.
2 Firm growth
We assume that each firm acts as a seller agent of a product from the same sort
of industry or it behaves as a provider of some service business. The spatial
economic activity of the ith agent is defined by its position x
(t)
i ∈ (0, L) and
by its selling area (x
(t)
i − r
(t)
i , x
(t)
i + r
(t)
i )modL, where L is the constant size of
one dimensional market space with periodic boundary conditions and r
(t)
i is the
selling radius of firm i. It should be noted that radius does not mean strictly
the space of the physical activity of the seller but it can be understood as a
radius up to which the customers are attracted. We have considered customers
uniformly distributed along a straight line. Interestingly, such arrangement is
typical for the restaurants distributed along a main road or highway [4].
We follow with definition of the measure of the spatial activity of the ith firm
s
(t)
i (x) =


1 if i claims to sell at the position x
0 if x is not from the agent’s selling area
(2)
Generally, large selling area means more potential consumers covered by de-
livery of given product which results higher interest connected to higher profit.
Without negative economic feedback, the continuous investment of the constant
fraction of income yields to the exponential growth of the firm size and its sale.
Several facts that yield the negative feedback between firm and its environment
should be mentioned: (i) the transportation costs of products are convex func-
tions of distance [11]; (ii) the complexity of firm management grows with a firm
size (iii) larger firms use more sophisticated and thus more expensive informa-
tion technologies; (iv) the presence of two or more competitive products in the
same location affects the prices as well as the annual sales.
Here we assume only a negative feedback that originates from the spatial
overlap of selling areas. The overlap of ith firm area with the areas of the
remaining (N − 1) firms is defined by
Ω
(t)
i =
N∑
j=0
j 6=i
∫ L
0
s
(t)
i (x)s
(t)
j (x)dx . (3)
With this firm-firm interaction picture in mind, we suggested the dynamical
rule of the firm growth
r
(t+1)
i = r
(t)
i + αr
(t)
i − βΩ
(t)
i , (4)
where α > 0 and β > 0 are constant parameters controlling the instantaneous
growth. The term −βΩ
(t)
i can be interpreted as a negative feedback that reflects
the competition. The selling area of firm i is expressed by
S
(t)
i =
∫ L
0
s
(t)
i (x) dx = 2r
(t)
i . (5)
3 Firm establishment and bankruptcy
In the stylized version of the model we study the firm is established at random
position with a small random initial selling radius r
(t)
i ∈ (ra, rb), where ra is
assumed to be the lower bound of profitability (smallest firm). Therefore, the
bankruptcy of a firm occurs when r
(t)
i < ra. At the same time new firm (with the
same index) is established at a new random position with some initially random
size. This death-birth process is analogous to the so called extremal dynamics
principle [1] applied to e.g. models of the wealth distribution [12] and stock
markets [7].
4 Simulation and Numerical results
The choice of parameters is chronic problem specially in models of the social-
economic systems. Although models of interacting agents give qualitative pre-
dictions that in many aspects resemble behavior of real-world systems, in the
most cases, the quantitative analysis needs laborious tuning of parameters until
the range is reached for which the phenomenon of interest takes place. Our sim-
ulations were performed with constant number of firms N = 500 for predefined
market area L = 3 × 105. The constant growth factor α = 0.01 and the initial
range of the selling space constrained by radii ra = 2.0 and rb = 5.0 is chosen
to invoke steps much smaller than L.
To reach the stationary regime 105 the initial synchronous system updates
were discarded. The information from subsequent 106 updates spent in sta-
tionary regime has been recorded. Their analysis has uncovered that firm-firm
interaction controlled by β admits to establish market regimes that differ in
size distributions. We observed that sufficiently large β leads to the market
with lowered overlaps. On other hand, sufficiently small β supports formation
of oligopoly that cover a dominant area of available market space. The impor-
tant for us power-law distributions are observable only for exceptional β (see
fig 4). This finding opens a question: what regulatory real-world economic prin-
ciple controls the sustaining of the empirically relevant power-law regimes. The
related question is the optimization of free parameters. For this purpose we ex-
amined several heuristic criteria. The most attractive seems to be an extremal
entropy principle [13], but in that case one faces to the usual problem of the
proper entropy definition.
More pragmatic, however, less fundamental attempt comes from our analysis
of firm-firm correlations. For this purpose the pair correlation function C of sizes
of nearest neighboring firms (k) at positions x
(t)
i ≤ x
(t)
k can be defined as
C =
〈 1
N
∑N
i=1 r
(t)
i r
(t)
k −
(
1
N
∑N
i=1 r
(t)
i
)2
1
N
∑N
i=1(r
(t)
i )
2 −
(
1
N
∑N
i=1 r
(t)
i
)2
〉
t
. (6)
Here 〈. . .〉t denotes temporal stationary average. The calculations for different
β uncovered that minimum of correlation function corresponds to parameter (or
narrow interval of parameters) for which nearly power-law distributions can be
fitted quite well. This extremal principle reflects the possible importance of the
measurements of the spatial correlations in social and economic systems.
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Figure 1: Plot of the pair correlation function defined by Eq. 6 as a function of β.
The Pareto’s law for the firm size belongs to β where C(β) attains its minimum.
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Figure 2: a.) Plot of sizes of firms as a function their rank for β = 2.0. The fitted
power-law index is close to unity. b.) The distribution of firm sizes.
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Figure 3: The time evolution of size of selected firm.
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Figure 4: Distribution of firm sizes plotted for different β.
5 Conclusions
By focusing on the geometric representation of firms we proposed a stylized
multi-agent model of firm growth. The competitive dynamics of firms under
which the system reaches a steady state results a complex patterns of firm loca-
tions. Despite of its formal simplicity, the model supplemented by the principle
of minimum firm-firm correlation is able to explain the origin of the Pareto’s
law. Further validating of model is planned that takes into account real-world
data. Hoverer, this will need to take into account the non-uniform distribution
of customers. The advanced model of this type is under development.
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